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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MATTHEW JAY HULL, 
Defendan^Appellant. 
Case No. 20051001-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a sentencing decision following his conviction for 
retail theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 
(West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the trial court acted within its discretion by sentencing 
defendant to serve his single misdemeanor sentence consecutively to 
a sentence he was already serving for another misdemeanor. 
Appellate courts review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. State 
v. Law, 2003 UT App 228, If 5,75 P.3d 923. "Trial courts abuse their discretion 'when 
[they] fail[] to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed 
exceeds the limits prescribed by law.'" Id. (quoting State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1166,52 
P.3d 1210). "Generally, a trial court's sentence 'should be overturned only when it is 
inherently unfair or clearly excessive/" Id. (quoting Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1166). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are included in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-208 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004); and 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant pled guilty to retail theft, a class A misdemeanor, on August 25, 
2005. R29,31-32,52:3. The court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI). 
R52:3-4. On October 3, 2005, the court sentenced defendant to 365 days in jail, 
suspended 180 days of the term, and ordered that the sentence run consecutively to 
the term defendant was already serving for another misdemeanor conviction. R38-
40 (Minutes: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment) (attached at Addendum B); see also 
R53:6. The court ordered defendant to complete a drug therapy program and a theft 
class, imposed a $2500 fine, suspended payment of the fine, and ordered defendant 
to pay $300 in attorney's fees. R39-40,53:6-7. The court also imposed an eighteen-
month probation term to be served following defendant's release from jail. R39-40, 
53:6-7. Defendant timely appealed. R43. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The crime 
On March 23, 2005, defendant entered a Gart Sports Store in Sandy. R2. 
While in the store, he concealed on his person several golf clubs valued at about 
$600. Id. A store clerk approached him to offer assistance, but defendant turned 
away from the employee and "acted evasive/7 Id. The clerk walked away. Id. As 
she turned back, she saw defendant removing golf clubs from his pants. Id. After 
discarding the merchandise, defendant exited the store. Id. 
Store employees later discovered that the same set of clubs was already short 
three clubs. PSI at 2. It appeared that defendant had stolen those clubs the day 
before and had returned to the store to get the rest of the set. Id. 
The sentencing hearing 
Several weeks after defendant entered his plea, the court conducted a 
sentencing hearing. R53. At the hearing, defense counsel requested that defendant, 
who was already serving a sentence for another misdemeanor, be placed on 
probation. R53:4. In the alternative, counsel requested that the court impose only 
"the eight or nine-month jail period with the CATS [Correctional Addiction 
Treatment Services] program." Id. 
3 
The court, however, sentenced defendant to 365 days, suspended 180 days, 
ran the sentence consecutively to the sentence that defendant was then serving, and 
ordered defendant's participation in the CATS program. R53:7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because defendant has not preserved his claim, he can prevail only if he can 
demonstrate plain error. Defendant cannot demonstrate error, let alone obvious 
error. Defendant's claim relies on Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004). Section 
401, however, does not limit the discretion of trial courts in sentencing defendants to 
consecutive sentences for misdemeanor convictions. The statute plainly states that 
the "section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases/7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(11). 
Thus, defendant's reliance on felony case law construing section 401 is misplaced. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced defendant to serve a 
180-day jail term consecutively to a sentence already being served for another 
misdemeanor conviction. The sentence, which was within the statutory limit for 
class A misdemeanors, was not inherently unfair, excessive or illegal. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS UNPRESERVED 
CLAIM BECAUSE HE CANNOT DEMONSTRATE PLAIN 
ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED THAT 
DEFENDANT SERVE HIS SINGLE MISDEMEANOR 
SENTENCE CONSECUTIVELY TO A SENTENCE HE WAS 
ALREADY SERVING ON ANOTHER MISDEMEANOR 
Defendant's claim is unpreserved. Therefore, he can prevail only if he can 
demonstrate plain error. Defendant's claim fails because he cannot demonstrate 
error, let alone obvious error. 
A. Defendant's claim is unpreserved. 
Defendant asserts that he preserved his claim that the trial court erred in 
imposing consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing when he requested, in lieu 
of jail time, "completion of the ACES program in combination with completion of 
the REAP program once [he] had completed [the sentence he was already serving on 
another conviction]/' Appellant's Br. at 2. He argues that "[requesting a lighter 
sentence [wa]s sufficient to preserve this issue for review." Id. at 10. 
Defendant's request for a lighter sentence did not preserve his claim that the 
imposition of consecutive sentences was inappropriate. Utah courts have long held 
that "[a] general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error 
must be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will review 
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such claim on appeal/7 State v. Tillman, 750 R2d 546,551 (Utah 1987). The objection 
must be "timely and specific'7 in order to satisfy this general rule. State v. Winfield, 
2006 UT 4,1114,128 R3d 1171 (quoting State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15,11 45,114 P.3d 
551). The claimed objection must be /7made with sufficient specificity to alert the 
trial court to the nature of the objection/7 State v. Blanchard, 1999 UT App 140, ^ 4 
(unpublished) (attached at Addendum C). " An oblique reference to an issue in the 
absence of an objection to the trial court's failure to rule on the issue does not put 
that issue properly before the court/7 State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).1 
Defendant did not raise his claim with sufficient specificity to alert the trial 
court to the nature of his objection. See R53:6-8. A request for a more lenient 
1
 This rule applies at sentencing, as well as during trial. In State v. Powell, 872 
P.2d 1027 (Utah 1994), the court expressly applied the general preservation rule to a 
sentencing hearing. Id. at 1033. In rejecting the defendants claim that he was 
entitled to a lesser sentence, the court noted that he "raised no objection to his 
sentence when it was imposed/7 Id. Moreover, this Court has universally applied 
the general preservation rule to sentencing decisions. See e.g., State v. Galvan, 2006 
UT App 28,11 3 (unpublished) (noting that the State's preservation argument was 
"well taken,77 but addressing the merits for good measure: "even if the issue were 
properly before us, Galvan7s argument would be unavailing77) (attached at 
Addendum C); State v. Coleman, 2002 UT App 198,112 (unpublished) (holding that 
when defendant did not "object or clearly specify her claim77 at sentencing, the claim 
was unpreserved) (attached at Addendum C); State v. Blanchard, 1999 UT App 140, 
1f 4 (unpublished) (holding that claim was unpreserved when defendant merely 
asked for a reduction in restitution: "The claimed objection was not made with 
sufficient specificity to alert the trial court to the nature of the objection/7). 
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sentence does not convey to the trial court a claim that the imposition of consecutive 
sentences constitutes error. Thus, defendant's claim is unpreserved. 
B. Defendant cannot demonstrate plain error. 
Defendant claims that even if he did not preserve the claim, the trial court 
plainly erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. To demonstrate plain error, a 
defendant must show that "(i) an error exists, (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant/' State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993). 
As explained under Point C, below, however, defendant cannot show error, 
much less obvious error. He therefore cannot prevail on his plain error claim. 
2
 Defendant cites several cases to demonstrate that his claim is preserved. See 
Appellant's Br. at 10. These cases are inapposite. State v. Helms, 2002 UT12,40 P.3d 
626, and State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, 82 P.3d 1167, do not explain how 
Helms and Valdovinos preserved their claims. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, UK 8-16; 
Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, K 11. They do not hold that requesting a lighter 
sentence sufficiently preserves a defendant's argument regarding consecutive 
sentences. In State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, 52 P.3d 451, the court expressly 
indicated that defense counsel objected to the consecutive sentences during the 
hearing. Id. at K 46-48. Finally, in State v. Thomas, 2006 UT App 106 (unpublished) 
(attached at Addendum C), the court merely noted that the State had argued that 
the claim was unpreserved. Id. at K1 n.l. The court did not hold that a request for a 
lighter sentence is sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal. Simply put, there is no 
case law supporting defendant's position. 
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C. The trial court properly ordered that defendant serve his single 
misdemeanor sentence consecutively to a sentence he was 
already serving for another misdemeanor 
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to "consider[] all legally relevant 
factors" when it imposed a consecutive sentence upon defendant. Appellant's Br. at 
4. In support of his argument, he cites Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004), 
which limits the discretion of trial courts when imposing consecutive sentences. Id. 
Because the statute clearly states that it applies only to sentences for felony 
convictions, defendant's reliance is misplaced. Defendant was sentenced for a 
misdemeanor. 
Section 401 is both a grant of authority for trial courts to impose consecutive 
sentences and a limitation on the normally wide discretion of sentencing courts. See 
State v. Helms, 2002 UT12,1f 9,40 P.3d 626 (explaining grant of authority, but noting 
that the court "must consider" several factors to properly exercise its discretion 
when sentencing defendant for multiple felonies); State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 
(Utah 1998) (holding that when sentencing defendant for multiple felonies, trial 
court "is required" to address certain factors mandated by section 401, and failure to 
do so is abuse of discretion); State v. Woodland, 945 R2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997) 
(describing trial court's "wide latitude and discretion in sentencing"). Although the 
court retains wide discretion, that discretion is limited by the requirements of 
section 401. 
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However, section 401 does not place these limitations on the trial court when 
the trial court sentences defendants for misdemeanors. "When interpreting statutes, 
this court first looks to the plain language/' State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,1f 29,127 
P.3d 682. "We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give 
effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning/' Id. (citations 
and quotation marks omitted). "Furthermore, we 'read the plain language of the 
statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the 
same chapter and related chapters/" Id. (quoting Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12,1117, 
66 P.3d 592). If the language of the statute is plain, "[o]ther interpretative tools are 
not needed in analyzing the statute." Id. 
Section 401 begins by referring specifically to felony offenses: "A court shall 
determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, 
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (West 2004) (emphasis added). It then lists the relevant 
legal factors that a trial court must consider when deciding to impose consecutive or 
cumulative sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (West 2004). In this and the 
next subsection, the statute refers to these convictions as "state offenses/' Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) & (3). The statute also addresses the conduct of the Board 
of Pardons, 76-3-401 (4)&(8), which has no jurisdiction over misdemeanor sentences 
unless they are served in a facility operated by the Department of Corrections. Utah 
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Code Ann. § 77-27-5(1)(a). The legislature mentions misdemeanor cases only in 
subsection 76-3-401(11). This subsection expressly excuses trial courts from 
complying with the strict requirements of this statute when sentencing defendants 
for misdemeanors. It states: "This section may not be construed to limit the 
authority of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases/' Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(11). According to the plain language of this subsection, the 
entire section— including subsections two and three—may not be construed to limit 
the court's discretion in sentencing defendants adjudged guilty of misdemeanors. 
Thus, the trial court need not state on the record that it considered the subsection 76-
3-401(2) legal factors in order to act within its discretion. 
The legislature's decision to limit this subsection to felony sentences is sound 
policy. When a defendant is adjudged guilty of multiple felonies, many of which 
require mandatory prison sentences, he could be subject to excessive amounts of 
court-imposed minimum prison time, served away from the court's supervision. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(l)-(2) (West 2004)(mandating a five-year minimum 
sentence in cases of first degree felonies, and a one-year minimum for felonies of the 
second degree). Upon sentencing, authority to supervise a convicted felon's 
sentence is transferred from the trial court to the Board of Pardons. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-27-5(1) (describing authority of Board of Pardons to commute or 
terminate sentences, grant parole, or order restitution). However, if a court 
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sentences a defendant to consecutive felony sentences having an excessive aggregate 
length, the Board of Pardons has no discretion to grant parole or release until after 
the minimums on each consecutive sentence are served by the defendant. The Utah 
Supreme Court addressed this problem in State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1993), 
when it held that a trial court abused its discretion by ordering a defendant 
convicted of several first degree felonies to serve his sentences consecutively, 
resulting in a twenty-four year minimum sentence. Id. at 1297,1302. The court held 
that this sentencing scheme "rob[bed] the Board of Pardons of flexibility to parole 
Strunk sooner." Id. at 1301. To prevent such injustices, the legislature enacted 
subsection 76-3-401(2), which requires the trial court to consider specific factors, 
thus preserving a record for appellate courts to review for an abuse of discretion. 
However, the same policy does not apply to misdemeanors, for which 
incarceration may not exceed one year per conviction, and which have no 
mandatory minimums. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (West 2004). 
Misdemeanants, as opposed to felons, are not brought under the Board of Pardons' 
supervision. They generally remain under the supervision of the court, and serve 
their time in county jails, which are not administered by the Department of 
Corrections. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-208 (West 2004) (providing for felony 
commitments to the Utah State Prison and for misdemeanor commitments to county 
jails). The trial court cannot "rob" the Board of Pardons of any flexibility because 
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the Board has no jurisdiction over a defendant serving a sentence in a county jail. 
See also State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432,1f1f 32-33,82 P.3d 1167 (distinguishing 
Strunk because three felonies for which Valdovinos was consecutively sentenced did 
not have mandatory minimums, and thus "the Board of Pardons would not be 
deprived of its flexibility to parole [Valdovinos] earlier77). Moreover, the sentences 
imposed in misdemeanor cases are short. They do not raise the same concerns as 
felony sentences that can potentially result in decades-long prison terms. 
In this case, the sentence that the trial court imposed was within the statutory 
limit set by the legislature. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (West 2004). It was not 
excessive: defendant was sentenced to only 180 days in jail, to be served 
consecutively with his then-current misdemeanor sentence, R53:6, which defense 
counsel indicated defendant would complete in approximately sixty days. Id. at 4. 
As a result, defendant would serve only one year's total time on his prior class B 
misdemeanor conviction and on the class A misdemeanor conviction in this case, a 
term the court could properly have imposed on the class A misdemeanor alone. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (West 2004). 
At sentencing, defense counsel asked the court to allow defendant to finish 
serving his time for his class B misdemeanor and grant him probation pending his 
participation in rehabilitation programs. R53:4. This would have resulted in no 
additional jail time for defendant, despite his having committed a more serious 
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crime on the second occasion. The court f ound this sentence inappropriate. It stated 
that a concurrent sentence did not reflect the repetitive nature of defendant's crimes: 
"I'm not going to reward you for committing multiple violations/7 R53:7. It did, 
however, suspend half of the yearlong sentence, conditioned upon defendant's 
participation in a rehabilitative program. Id. 
The trial court did not err by sentencing defendant to a sentence running 
consecutively to another misdemeanor sentence that defendant was currently 
serving. The plain language of section 401 and sound policy indicate that the 
legislature was concerned only with consecutive sentences for felony convictions. 
Because defendant relies exclusively on section 401 and case law interpreting it, his 
argument fails. 
3
 Even if the trial court were required to consider the factors enumerated in 
section 401, there is ample evidence that it did so. For example, the court focused on 
the repetitive nature of defendant's crime. R53:7. The court was aware of the 
nature and gravity of the crime and knew that defendant had not been successful in 
removing the golf clubs from the store, as was plainly stated in both the information 
and PSI. See R53:6-8; see also Rl-2, PSI at 2. It addressed defendant's history of retail 
theft, his drug addiction, and his failures to meet previous probation requirements. 
R53:5-6. It expressed concern that defendant had not improved his behavior since 
1992, when he was first convicted of retail theft. R53:6. Finally, the court not only 
considered, but accommodated defendant's rehabilitative needs by reducing his jail 
time to six months: "[If] I gave you a year in jail as opposed to six months, it would 
take a lot longer to get into the CATS program." R53:7. The trial court in this case 
either explicitly addressed or was certainly aware of each factor delineated in 
section 401. This Court has held that trial courts are not required to "explicitly 
address the enumerated factors" as long as there is "ample evidence in the record 
13 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
Respectfully submitted \JLU\ML \\Q , 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
M/flJL-
NNE B. INOUYE 0 
tant Attorney General 
el for Appellee 
that the court considered these factors at the time of Defendant's sentencing." 
Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432,1130. If a court indicates that it has reviewed material 
that addresses these factors, such as the PSI, then that is "sufficient to demonstrate 
that a defendant's history, character, and rehabilitative needs had been considered." 
Id. 1f 31 (citing State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,11 3, 40 P.3d 626). Here, the trial court 
frequently referred to information contained in the PSI, dated the document, and 
made hand-written corrections as they were brought to its attention. Compare 
handwritten notations on PSI at 1-4 with R53:2-3. Thus, even if section 401 applied 
to consecutive misdemeanor sentences, the court complied with its duty by either 
explicitly addressing or devoting attention to the factors delineated in section 401. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
§ 76 -3 -204 . Misdemeanor conviction—Term of imprisonment 
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to 
imprisonment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding one year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding six 
months; 
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding ninety 
days. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-204. 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 8 . Imprisonment—Custodial authorities 
(1) Persons sentenced to imprisonment shall be committed to the following 
custodial authorities: 
(a) felony commitments shall be to the Utah State Prison; 
(b)(i) class A misdemeanor commitments shall be to the jail, or other 
facility designated by the town, city, or county where the defendant was 
convicted, unless the defendant consents to commitment to the Utah State 
Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed one year; 
(ii) if the defendant consents to commitment to the Utah State Prison for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed one year, the court may impose the 
sentence. The court may not order the imprisonment of a defendant to the 
Utah State Prison for a fixed term or other term that is inconsistent with 
this section and Section 77-18-4; 
(c) all other misdemeanor commitments shall be to the jail or other facility 
designated by the town, city or county where the defendant was convicted. 
(2) Custodial authorities may place a prisoner in a facility other than the one 
to which he was committed when: 
(a) it does not have space to accommodate him; or 
(b) the security of the institution or inmate requires it. 
PART 4. LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON SENTENCES 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 4 0 1 . Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutive-
ly with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecu-
tively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pcirdons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct 
which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a coin! of another state or federal jurisdiction, 
and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his 
initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board 
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
_ (a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if 
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrent-
ly with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to aflFect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1; Laws 
1994, c. 13, § 21; Laws 1995, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 283, § 1, eff. 
May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 275, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, c. 129, § 1, eff. July 
1, 2002. 
(l)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority decision 
when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the 
state, persons committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at 
penal or correctional facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the Depart-
ment of Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or impeachment or as 
otherwise limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned, restitution 
ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their sen-
tences commuted or terminated. 
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The chair 
shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and in accordance 
with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings involving commuta-
tion and pardons. The chair may participate on any panel and when doing 
so is chair of the panel. The chair of the board may designate the chair for 
any other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution remit-
ted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence terminated, 
except after a full hearing before the board or the board's appointed examin-
er in open session. Any action taken under this subsection other than by a 
majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board. 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing 
before the board. 
(e) The board shall determine restitution in an amount that does not 
exceed complete restitution if determined by the court in accordance with 
Section 77-38a-302. 
(2)(a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole 
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the hearing 
shall be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's office responsi-
ble for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law enforcement officials 
responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction, and whenever possible, 
the victim or the victim's family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include 
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by 
the board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms 
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the board in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations 
or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are 
final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents 
the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment, including restitution as 
provided in Section 77-27-6. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the 
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for 
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment. 
However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or 
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or 
pardon the offense as provided. In the case of conviction for treason, the 
governor may suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to 
the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or 
commute the sentence, or direct its execution. 
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders serv-
ing sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have their 
fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated, the 
board shall consider whether the persons have made or are prepared to make 
restitution as ascertained in accordance with the standards and procedures of 
Section 77-38a-302, as a condition of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or 
forfeitures, or commutation or termination of sentence. 
(6) In determining whether parole may be terminated, the board shall 
consider the offense committprl V»v thp> r^™!^ +v»o o^w i^** ~~~:—i --J~ J -•-
Addendum B 
3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW JAY HULL, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051400273 FS 
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
Date: October 3, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: mindyg 
Prosecutor: MCKINNON CRANDALL, KIMBERLY A 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): HOWARD, STEPHEN W 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 4, 1966 
Audio 
Tape Number: 5101 Tape Count: 1042 
CHARGES 
1. RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) 
Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 08/25/2005 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
(amended) - Class A 
Based on the defendant's conviction of RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) a 
Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 3 65 
day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 18 0 day(s). 
Page 1 
Case No: 051400273 
Date: Oct 03, 2005 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2500.00 
Total Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $2500.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $300.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS 
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Adult Probation 
8c Parole. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 185 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
No other violations. 
Comply with Adult Probation and Parole. 
Notify the court of any address change. 
Timely payments of all fines, attorney fees and restitution. 
Not to possess/consume alcohol or non prescribed controlled 
substance. 
Randon urinalysis and drug testing as requested. 
Notify probation agent of any prescribed medication. 
Not to associate with persons or frequent places where drugs or 
alcohol are being used or are the chief item of sale. 
Submit to search of self or property by probation agent. 
Enroll and complete the CATS and aftercare program. 
Maintain fulltime verifiable employment/education. 
Paae 2 
Case No: 051400273 
Date: Oct 03, 2005 
Deft to complete a Theft class through AP&P 
Dated this day of , 2 0 
TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
District Court Judge 
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Addendum C 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Marty Joe Galvan, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20050005-CA 
F I L E D 
(February 2, 2 006} 
2006 UT App 28 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 041904272 
The Honorable John Paul Kennedy 
Attorneys: Elizabeth Hunt, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are 
adequately presented in the briefs and record[,] and the 
decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral 
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues 
presented are readily resolved under applicable law. 
Galvan appeals his sentence, alleging that he did not 
receive the benefit of his plea agreement because the State made 
an initial sentence recommendation that violated the agreement. 
He argues that, although the State later withdrew its initial 
recommendation and made an affirmative recommendation that 
conformed to the plea agreement, he is entitled to specific 
performance of the agreement and resentencing in front of a new 
judge. 
The State argues that this issue was not properly preserved 
for appeal because Galvan did not object to the sentencing but, 
after noting the apparent breach, actually asked the judge to 
consider the State's corrected recommendation and go forward with 
the sentencing--never mentioning the issue of being entitled to 
sentencing before a new judge. The State's argument is well 
taken. See State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) ("An oblique reference to an issue in the absence of an 
'objection to the trial court's failure to rule on the issue1 
does not put that issue properly before the court.") (citation 
omitted). 
But even if the issue were properly before us, Galvan's 
argument would be unavailing. Utah case law is clear that when 
the State initially breaches the plea agreement, is made aware of 
its mistake, and then changes its recommendation to conform to 
the agreement, the initial breach is cured unless there is 
evidence the trial court was influenced by the initial 
recommendation. See State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222,f21, 95 P. 3d 
1203. There is no such evidence here. 
Affirmed.1 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
2Galvan also appeals the trial court's ruling that it no 
longer had jurisdiction to rule on Galvan's rule 22(e) motion 
that was submitted after he initiated this appeal. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(e). We need not reach this issue, as the sentence 
here was not illegally imposed, and thus, any rule 22(e) motion 
based on the State's initial breach of the plea agreement would 
have been futile. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jamie Bret Coleman, 
Defendant and Appellant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No 20010192-CA 
F I L E D 
June 6, 2002 
ll 2002 UTApp 198 \\ 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Judith S Atherton 
Attorneys 
Janet Miller, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L Shurtleff and Karen A Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Greenwood 
GREENWOOD, Judge 
Defendant appeals the portion of her sentence requiring her to pay restitution for the cleanup of a 
methamphetamine lab in connection with her conviction for possession of methamphetamine We affirm because 
Defendant did not timely object to the restitution order when the sentence was imposed 
As a general rule, a defendant must timely object to an error in order to preserve the issue for appeal See State 
v Cram, 2002 UT 37,1J14, 444 Utah Adv Rep 15 This general rule also applies in the sentencing phase of 
criminal proceedings See State v Powell, 872 P 2d 1027, 1033 (Utah 1994) In Powell, the defendant appealed 
his sentence claiming that the trial court failed to sentence him to the lesser penalty for manslaughter The 
supreme court denied the defendant's request to correct the sentence because, among other reasons, "[the 
defendant] raised no objection to his sentence when it was imposed " IcL (emphasis added) Further, to 
Dreserve an issue for appeal, a party "must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon " Holmstrom v C R England, Inc . 2000 UT App 239J26, 8 P 3d 281 
emphasis and citation omitted) In this case, although Defendant alluded to her assertion that "[i]t was not 
Defendant's] house" at the initial sentencing hearing, she did not object or clearly specify her claim Defendant 
leither objected when the trial court imposed the restitution sentence at the second hearing, nor asked the trial 
ourt to rule on the issue she now raises Therefore, Defendant did not preserve the issue for appeal n^See id 
kJlClL^ KJX W t u i x T . w v 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
1. On appeal, Defendant does not argue plain error, exceptional circumstances, or that her sentence was illegal 
under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Kent William Blanchard, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
CaseNo.981044-CA 
F I L E D 
April 29,1999 
1999 UTApp 140 
Second District, Farmington Department 
The Honorable Jon M. Memmott 
Attorneys: 
Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Catherine M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Wilkins, Greenwood, and Davis. 
WILKINS, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant, Kent W. Blanchard, appeals from a restitution order requiring him to pay $882.00 as part of 
his sentence for theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995). We 
affirm. 
A. RESTITUTION 
First, defendant maintains that the trial court's failure to conduct a separate restitution hearing pursuant 
o Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) denied him of procedural due process. 
This section provides that 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the 
court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(e) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this section to "require[] that after restitution is ordered and 
after an inmate objects to the order, the . . . [court] must hold a 'full hearing' on the inmate's objections." 
Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996). However, if a defendant fails to object to the 
imposition, amount or distribution of the restitution ordered, or fails to request a hearing on the matter, 
he waives his right to challenge the restitution order. See State v. Snyder. 747 P.2d 417,421 (Utah 
1987). 
Defendant insists that he properly objected to the court's restitution order. He points to the following 
statements at sentencing, among others: 
[Defendant]: [Mr. Howard] should not be entitled to earn profit on the side jobs where I did 
all the labor myself. If he's only out thirteen hundred and something dollars in materials and 
labor, as you're claiming, then my $500 should be subtracted from that and the difference 
[$882] should be paid to him. 
I figure I owe him about $500. That was stated in the original phone conversation. 
We do not regard this statement, or others identified by defendant, as adequate to raise an objection to 
the court's restitution order. The claimed objection was not made with sufficient specificity to alert the 
trial court to the nature of the objection. See State v. Rangel 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(requiring timely and specific objection to preserve issue for appeal). At most, the cited statements 
reflect defendant's request that the court immediately determine restitution and also show defendant's 
assistance in calculating the restitution, which formula the court ultimately adopted in making its order. 
We therefore conclude that defendant waived his right to challenge the court's restitution order, and also 
hold that the circumstances of this case do not constitute plain error in that defendant's objection was 
necessary for the court to be obligated to hold the additional full hearing on restitution. Since the 
objection was not made in a manner that could have alerted the trial court, there is no error, plain or 
otherwise. As such, we reject defendant's due process claim. 
B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Second, defendant argues that his trial counsel's failure to timely object to the restitution order and to 
formally request a separate restitution hearing denied him of his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel. To be successful in this argument, defendant must affirmatively prove that his 
"counsel's performance was deficient in that it 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness/ and 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial." State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688,104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 
(1984)). A defendant must prove both prongs of the Strickland test, see Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 
522 (Utah 1994); failure to do so precludes the necessity to consider the other. "Additionally, [t]o 
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance . . . [defendant] must demonstrate that counsel's actions were 
not conscious trial strategy, and that there was a lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's 
actions." State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation and internal quotations 
omitted). Further, if we can dispose of an ineffective assistance claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice, we follow that course. See Parsons, 871 P.2d at 523. 
Defendant has failed to meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. He cannot satisfy this burden by 
merely stating that "[b]ut for counsel's deficient performance of failing to object, there would likely have 
been a different determination as to the amount of court-ordered restitution/' Rather, to show prejudice, 
he must "proffer sufficient evidence to support 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different/" Id at 522 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,104 S. Ct. at 2068). Defendant's failure to proffer such evidence requires us 
to reject his argument. 
Affirmed. 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robert Craig Thomas, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20050013-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 16 , 2006) 
2006 UT App 106 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 041905292 
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Attorneys: John P. Pace and Catherine E. Roberts, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, McHugh, and Thorne. 
McHUGH, Judge: 
Robert Craig Thomas appeals his sentence of two 
indeterminate prison terms of zero to five years and two jail 
terms of twelve months, all to be served consecutively. Thomas 
pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, theft by 
deception, attempted unlawful use of a transaction card, and 
attempted forgery. Thomas argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by (1) failing to order a diagnostic evaluation and 
probation and (2) ordering that the sentences be served 
consecutively rather than concurrently.1 We affirm. 
The record reveals that Thomas's crimes stem from a lengthy 
methamphetamine addiction. The presentence report stated that 
Thomas had been imprisoned several times in the past for drug-
related crimes and had completed several treatment programs. 
The report also stated that Thomas was still using drugs 
xThe State argues that Thomas failed to preserve either of 
his arguments. After reviewing the record, we conclude that both 
issues were sufficiently addressed by the trial court and should 
be resolved on the merits by this court. 
regularly despite receiving treatment. The report recommended 
more prison time. 
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard statements 
from several victims of Thomas's crimes. The court also heard 
from defense counsel, who stated that the prosecution had agreed 
to probation if Thomas could enter an intensive inpatient program 
such as the Odyssey House. The judge noted that although she was 
disinclined to order probation, it would be possible only if 
Thomas first underwent a diagnostic evaluation. The following 
exchange then occurred: 
THE COURT: I'll be frank with you, 
[defense] counsel, and indicate to you that 
I'm doing the diagnostic evaluation because I 
believe in looking at all alternatives, but 
frankly at this point I'm inclined to send 
him to prison. But we will see how he 
performs in the diagnostic unit, and whatever 
the penalty is going to be it's going to 
involve a significant amount of time behind 
bars. 
You need to be prepared for that. It's 
not going to be a month or two. And so I'd 
put your best foot forward, sir, at the 
diagnostic center, and if you do treat this 
as a joke, or flippantly, . . . the 
consequences will be real and significant. 
Do you understand me? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Forthwith--and 
we'll set this ninety days hence. I think 
I'm going to ask for a ninety-day diagnostic 
evaluation. 
THE DEFENDANT: Just send me to prison, 
then. 
THE COURT: You'd just like to go to 
prison? 
THE DEFENDANT: Just send me to prison. 
I ain't doing no evaluation. I ain't wasting 
ninety days. 
THE COURT: So why don't you want to do 
it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Because they're going to 
recommend prison automatic. Every--your 
honor, every time I've been in front of 
anybody, I went straight to prison. They 
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send me to prison. I don't get no chance in 
there. 
I'm a drug addict. I'm sorry for what I 
did to them people. You think I like what I 
do? No, I don't like doing it. I want to go 
to Odyssey House where I can get some help. 
. . . No matter what I say, no matter what I 
do in diagnostic, they're going to send me to 
prison. . . . The board's going to look at 
that ninety days, and they're going to go, 
"So what?" 
The trial court subsequently offered Thomas a chance to 
confer with his attorney, after which the court stated, "Mr. 
Thomas, your attitude has had an impact on me. I'm inclined to 
do what you've asked . . . and that is sentence you to prison." 
Thomas replied, "Okay, your honor. Thank you." The court then 
imposed the maximum sentences allowed by statute and ordered that 
they run consecutively. Thomas later filed a Motion for Relief 
from Judgment, which was denied. 
Thomas asserts the trial court misconstrued his comments as 
exhibiting a poor attitude when in actuality he was merely 
expressing his desire to overcome his drug addiction. He 
contends that the court then retaliated against him for his 
comments by sentencing him to consecutive prison terms rather 
than probation. 
"We review the sentencing decisions of a trial court for 
abuse of discretion." State v. Montova, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) (quotations and citation omitted). Abuse of 
discretion may be manifest if the judge acts with inherent 
unfairness in sentencing, imposes a clearly excessive sentence, 
or fails to consider all legally relevant factors. See id. "An 
appellate court may only find abuse if it can be said that no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
court." Id. (alteration in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
Thomas first contends the trial court should have ordered an 
evaluation and probation. "Whether or not the judge elects to 
order an evaluation before passing sentence is clearly within 
[her] discretion, based on [her] own judgment of the case before 
[her]." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
Moreover, the granting of "[p]robation is not a matter of right," 
but involves "considering intangibles of [the defendant's] 
character, personality[,] and attitude, of which the cold record 
gives little inkling." State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 
388, 393 (1957). For this reason, the decision whether to grant 
probation necessarily rests with the trial court. See id.: see 
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also State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 730 (Utah 1980) (same); 
State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (same). 
A trial court abuses its discretion if a defendant "clearly 
show[s] that the trial judge would have granted probation except 
for some wholly irrelevant, improper[,] or inconsequential 
consideration." Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393. 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
ordered prison time rather than a diagnostic evaluation or 
probation. We cannot know from the cold record on appeal, see 
id., the attitude Thomas exhibited to the trial court. 
Furthermore, at the outset, the judge stated that she planned to 
sentence Thomas to significant prison time. She also expressed 
uncertainty as to whether a diagnostic evaluation would 
accomplish anything. We cannot conclude that the trial judge 
would have granted probation absent some wholly improper 
consideration. See id. 
Thomas's second argument is that the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to consider all of the necessary factors 
before imposing consecutive sentences. Utah Code section 76-3-
401 states: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant 
has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent 
or consecutive sentences for the 
offenses. . . . 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are 
to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses, the number of 
victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1), (2) (2003). "Concurrent sentences 
are favored over consecutive ones." State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 
211,1143, 52 P.3d 451. 
Thomas argues that because the trial court did not make 
findings on the record regarding the gravity and circumstances of 
his offense, the number of victims, and his history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs, it failed to consider these statutory 
factors and, thus, improperly imposed consecutive sentences. 
This argument is foreclosed by State v. Helms, 2 002 UT 12, 40 
P.3d 626, in which the Utah Supreme Court, considering a similar 
issue, stated: "[A] s a general rule [we] uphold[] the trial 
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court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever 
it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made 
such findings." Id. at 1}ll (quotations and citation omitted). 
This assumption should not be made, though, when "(1) an 
ambiguity of facts makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a 
statute explicitly provides that written findings must be made, 
or (3) a prior case states that findings on an issue must be 
made." Id. "Absent these circumstances, we will not assume that 
the trial court's silence, by itself, presupposes that the court 
did not consider the proper factors as required by law." Id. 
Neither case law nor statute requires a trial court to make 
specific findings of fact in a sentencing order. Thus, an 
ambiguity of facts would be the only circumstance in which record 
findings need be made. See id. 
Here, the record supports a conclusion that the trial court 
considered these factors even though it did not make formal 
findings on the record. The presentence report contained 
detailed information about Thomas's criminal history, his past 
attempts at rehabilitation, and the circumstances of the 
offenses. The judge referred to specific parts of the 
presentence report before sentencing and asked counsel for both 
sides whether any changes needed to be made to the report. The 
judge clearly relied on the information in the report in 
determining Thomas's sentence. The court also heard from several 
victims of Thomas's crimes before imposing the sentence. 
Therefore, it is apparent that the trial court considered the 
statutory factors. We see no ambiguity of facts that would have 
necessitated record findings. 
Thomas also asserts that the court ignored the presentence 
report's recommendation of concurrent sentences. However, a 
trial court is not required to follow the recommendations of a 
presentence report. See State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1300 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("The entire sentencing process is a search 
for truth and an evaluation of alternatives. Therefore, the 
recommendations of the prosecutor or any other party are not 
binding upon the court." (citation omitted)). The sentence was 
within the statutory guidelines, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-
203(3), -204 (2003), and, thus, was not clearly unfair or 
excessive. Thomas has provided nothing that would support a 
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conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
sentenced him. 
Affirmed. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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